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Abstract
In this paper we consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In
the ﬁrst period, an individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which
she will select one in the second period. In the second period, the individual might
chooseanalternative thatshe wouldﬁndinferiorinthe ﬁrstperiod. Thiseventuality
need not occur with certainty but might be triggered by the nature of the set chosen
in the ﬁrst period. We propose a model for this problem and axioms for ﬁrst-period
preferences, in which the second period choice could be interpreted as being made
by an “alter-ego” who appearswith some probability. We provide a discussion of the
behavioural implications of our model as compared with existing theories.
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1 Introduction
As ﬁrst pointed out by Schelling (1978, 1984), the self-control problems we face in our
everyday lives pose a dilemma for the usual model of rational choice. Schelling’s 1984
Ely lecture to the American Economic Association starts off with the woman who, be-
fore delivery, asks her obstetrician to withhold anaesthesia during delivery but, while
in the throes of delivering her child, experiences extreme pain and changes her mind.
This example is characteristic of a class of phenomena characterised by individuals “at-
tempting to overrule one’s own preferences,” as Schelling puts it. There are several ways
of understanding these phenomena and many of them are mentioned in this article of
Schelling’s, all using the language of multiple selves. For example, one could regard one
type of behaviour as a mistake; constraining oneself enables us to “separate the anoma-
lous behaviour from the rational; we take sides with whichever consumer self appeals to
us as the authentic representation of values.” One can also, as Schelling says, treat these
selves more symmetrically and ask “To which patient is a physician obligated ... the one
asking for anaesthesia or the one who asked that it be withheld?” And later in the article,
“... without necessarily taking sides..., we can say that it looks as if different selves took
turns, each self wanting its own values to govern what the other selves will do... .”
Schelling also recognises the difﬁculties with speaking of “multiple selves”; he writes
that he is only secure using this terminology among economists because questions might
arise, in law, for example, as to which self was party to a contract or violated the law.
An important feature of the examples in Schelling’s work is that each self obtains
utility even when it is absent (when another self is in control), as in the woman who after
the delivery would have preferred not to have asked for anaesthesia during the delivery.
DavidGauthier (1987)has aninteresting exampleofthe personwhopreferredrockmusic
at 20 and prefers classical music at 40, but the 40-year self would have preferred to have
preferred classical music when he was 20. (Likewise the 20-year old would no doubt want
not to like classical music more than rock at 40, even though “he” would have been gone
for 20 years by the time his classical-music-loving self is in control.)1 Introduction 3
As noted above, Schelling introduces three distinct ways of thinking about people
who “overrule their own preferences.” The ﬁrst is that they make mistakes, the second
is that they have preferences that change over time and the third is that decision makers
have multiple selves, one of whom makes the actual choice. Our model, closest to the
third approach, seeks to explain the behaviour described by Schelling as a temporary loss
of control, with choices being made as if by a virtual alter-ego with different preferences
but being evaluated in accordance with the decision-maker’s own long-term preferences.
Moreover, this loss of control is not certain to happen (or certain not to happen); there is
some uncertainty as to whether an individual will be tempted or not.
It is best to think of our approach in an intertemporal context, though explicit con-
sideration of time is deferred to another paper. An individual has to make a choice from a
set of lotteries at some point in the future. At an earlier point in time, she gets to choose
a menu of lotteries from which to make his future choice. We are interested in the fol-
lowing behaviour, which the individual considers a possibility. The menu chosen might
trigger temptation in the next period (modelled here as an alternative self, with different
preferences from the initial one, assuming control of making a choice from the menu) or
it might not (so that the same self remains in charge of the choice). The probability of
the alternate self taking over is menu-dependent. Whichever self is in charge of making a
choice from the menu in the second period makes its own most preferred choice. Each
self does not particularly care about the utilities of the other self, so this is not an interde-
pendent utilities model, but does care about the choice made (purchases of classical music
CDsvs.other kinds inthe second period). Let x beatypical menuand β atypical lottery
in the menu. This gives the decision-maker a utility function of the following form:
U(x) =(1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
where U is the individual’s utility from a menu, u her utility from a lottery, v is the
alter-ego’s utility from a lottery and Bv(x) is the set of v-maximisers in x. We shall
take ρx
1 to be the probability that the individual gets tempted (when faced with the
1Needless to say, ρx must satisfy certain regularity properties. For more on this, see §3.1 Introduction 4
choices in the menu x), which results in the alter-ego making a choice. We shall say that
a utility function over menus which takes such a form admits a dual self representation.
We provide axioms for ﬁrst period preferences over menus so that the decision-maker’s
utility from a menu is given by the equation above. Thus, a decision-maker who satisﬁes
our axioms behaves as if there is a probability of his getting tempted, when a choice has
to be made from a menu, which is represented as the choice being made by an alter-ego.
It should be emphasised that the alter-ego (and his utility function v) is subjective, as is
the probability, ρx, of getting tempted. The only observables are ﬁrst period choices over
menus. We introduce a slight asymmetry between the selves in that the alter-ego, if he
has to make a choice, will choose, among his most preferred alternatives, that which is
most preferred by the decision-maker. Since we are characterising the decision-maker’s
utility, how she breaks ties does not really matter to us.
Several recent papers have focused on the problems raised by Schelling. The paper
closest in spirit to ours is the innovative paper by Bernheim and Rangel (2004), who
speciﬁcally deal with addiction and are clear that, in their view, the individual who takes
drugs is making a mistake caused by overestimating the amount of pleasure consumption
would involve relative to the long-term costs of such consumption. The selves are not
treated symmetrically; drug consumption is anomalous and abstaining from it rational.
Their model also explicitly takes into account the effect of environmental cues in trigger-
ingthe changeofthe controlling self, fromcold tohot. Herethecold selfis supposed tobe
the preference that usually represents the agent, while the hot self is the one who makes
the anomalous choices. Fudenberg and Levine (2005) adopt an explicitly dual self model
for these dynamic choice problems and focus on the game between the selves rather than
onthe axiomatisation of a virtualdual self model, as we do here. Eliaz and Spiegler (2004)
study contracting issues with several preference representations, including dual selves.2
The interpretation of anomalous choices as mistakes might be problematic, because
the mistakes appear to be systematically in one direction (no one makes a mistake by
2Inthis context, also see Esteban and Miyagawa (2005a,b) and Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum(2003)who
also have an example where a car could be tempting, but a different one from our paper.1 Introduction 5
consuming too little chocolate cake). The behaviour might instead indicate either cog-
nitive limitations on the effects of the cake or a temporary loss of self-control. Nor is
it wholly satisfactory to think of the problem of self-control as one of changing prefer-
ences, because the individual concerned might continue to prefer something, say good
health to bad, while engaging in behaviour, say smoking, which seems antithetical to
such preferences.
Also breaking the link between choice and preference has problems; for instance,
how are we to talk about welfare if we cannot infer preferences from the choices that are
made? Our main contribution in this paper is to point out that if the domain of choice is
appropriately deﬁned (as choice of feasible sets), then we can talk about decision makers
who make choices over decision problems who behave as if the actual choice (from the
feasible set)maybemadebythealter-ego. Sincethealter-egosupposedly only shows upin
the presence of certain cues, we consider the decision-maker’s preferences over decision
problems where the alter-ego does not affect her (i.e. ﬁrst-period menu choice problems),
thus maintaining the link between choice and welfare.
In terms of formalism, our paper is closest to Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001,
2005) (henceforth DLR and DLR05 respectively) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) (hence-
forth GP). We discuss these papers in more detail in §5. Samuelson and Swinkels (2004)
explore the evolutionary foundations of temptation. They develop a model where en-
dowing humans with utilities of menus that depend on unchosen alternatives is an opti-
mal choice for nature from an evolutionary perspective.
Gul and Pesendorfer also emphasise the choice and welfare issue raised earlier in this
section and the difﬁculties an explicitly multiple selves model might cause with respect to
this issue. As an illustration of the importance of this point, we note that Bernheim and
Rangel refer to addicts’ description of past use of addictive substances as a mistake. How-
ever, verbal communication (from the addict) could be quite unreliable. What does sug-
gest that substance (ab)use may indeed be considered a mistake by the abuser is reﬂected
in the observation that agents notice their susceptibility to certain cues and anticipate
making ex-ante inferior choices and act so as to manage their addiction in a sophisticated2 Examples 6
way. Thus, agents reveal that their choices (from a menu) may not always reﬂect their
true preferences and act in order to constrain themselves suitably.3
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In §2, we illustrate the workings
of our model by looking more closely at Schelling’s patient (§2.1). We also discuss a sim-
ple bargaining model (§2.2) where the importance of the “timing of temptation” (i.e. the
instant at which the agent feels tempted) is illustrated. In §3 we introduce our model, in
§4 the axioms and our representation theorem and sketch the proof of the representation
theorem in §4.2. We compare our axioms with those of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) in
§5.1 and with those of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001, 2005) in §5.2 and explore the
workings of our model extended to the case of multiple exogenous states of the world in
§5.3. §6 concludes and proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Examples
In this section, we consider some examples that illustrate the behavioural contrasts be-
tween our proposal and those advanced in the literature, notably the inﬂuential paper of
GP.
2.1 Schelling’s Patient
To recall, the example is of a woman who asks her doctor to refuse any pleas she might
make for an anaesthetic to relieve her pain during delivery. The patient might not be
aware of the extent of the possible pain, so any choice here is a lottery. Suppose that the
possible choices are β = anaesthetic and α = no anaesthetic and that the woman can also
constrain her future choices by choosing to have the baby in a remote cottage without
3Bernheim and Rangel also have a discussion of American tourists in Britain who persist in looking left
ﬁrst when crossing; clearly by so doing they are not signalling their preference for a collision with a vehicle
to no collision. But most tourists, realising this will happen, probably constrain themselves to wait for a
“Walk” signal or use a zebra crossing in circumstances where they would cross the road without waiting in
their home country. Thus, choices over these decision problems do, in fact, reﬂect their preferences.2.1 Schelling’s Patient 7
access to painkillers and physicians. Then, assuming that other risks are kept constant
between the choice of the hospital and the cottage, the hospital involves a menu x1 =
{α,β} and the cottage x2 ={α}. One would expect the patient to prefer x2 if she feels she
might be tempted by the availability of the painkiller in the hospital.4
Werationalise the preferences above by saying that the woman behaves as if shehas an
alter-ego who, she believes, will take over the decision-making in the hospital with some
probability. We assume too that the untempted self (with utility function u( )) would
prefer α and the alter-ego, i.e. the tempted self (with utility v( )) would prefer β, each
“self” in the absence of the other.
In our speciﬁcation, the untempted type, given she goes to the hospital, would always
forgo the anaesthetic before she goes into delivery but with positive probability ask for it
above some pain threshold during the actual procedure. 5
Such ﬁrst-period preferences are also consistent with the axioms of Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2001). We discuss their paper in more detail later on but, in brief, GP’s patient
would choose   β ∈ x to maximise u(   β) − c(   β,x) but would incur self-control costs
of c(   β,x) := maxβ′∈x v(β′) − v(   β). (Recall that maxβ′∈x v(β′) = v(β).) Thus, if she
goes to the hospital, her utility would be max   β∈x1
 
u(   β)+v(   β)
 
− v(β). If the ﬁrst
term were maximised by α, the patient would ask the doctor to forgo an anaesthetic and
knows that she will not change her mind during childbirth, but would get a lower utility
from the menu x1 than from x2 where there are no self-control costs. If the ﬁrst term
were maximised by β, then the menu x1 would yield the utility u(β) and x2 would yield
u(α)+v(α)−v(α) = u(α). In other words, the patient has a very high cost of self-control
4Our colleague Sophie Bade has pointed out that there is an echo of Bernheim-Rangel here, in that
someone addicted to painkillers might, for long-run health reasons, want to avoid being tempted by them.
5The patient’s instructions to the doctor could be interpreted as an expression of the preferences given
by the u( ) utility function and asking for the anaesthetic later the similar expression of the v( ) utility
function. We could also think of the instructions prior to entering the hospital as creating another menu
item β′, where now there is some probability that the doctor would refuse the anaesthetic even if it were
to be asked for. Such a menu item would replace β and therefore make the hospital more preferred for the
long-run type than the presence of β would entail.2.2 A Bargaining Application 8
and gives in to her temptation.
In GP, either could happen but only one will and the decision-maker knows which
outcome will occur. If both x1 and x2 are available both GP and our model would predict
the choice of x2.
TheonlydifferencebetweenourpaperandGP,inthisexample, isthereforeinimplied
second-period behaviour. If the woman chooses the hospital, she will be tempted with
some probability in our framework.
2.2 A Bargaining Application
In this application, we shall demonstrate the kinds of behaviour that are likely to emerge
if the agent has self-control problems. From a technical perspective, we shall also show
how our model can be adapted to a situation where there might be exogenous states, an
issue addressed in §5.3.
Suppose the decision-maker wants to buy a car. There is a dealer who stocks two
kinds of cars, the sedate type B and the souped-up coupé type C. Let us describe the
environment in detail.
Seller. The seller chooses the types of cars available on display. His actions lead to a
probability distribution over the menus {B,C}, {B} and {C}. Let the actions be so that
the probability of {B} be 1−q. The cars are both worth 0 to him.
Decision-maker. He values both types of cars equally at b. He has an outside option
worth 0. He also has an alter-ego who values the type B car at   b and the type C car
at c. His outside option is   c is C is not present and c if C is present on the lot. (The
motivation for this is that the alter-ego has different costs of walking away if car C is
presenton thelot.) The probability of temptation is such the alter-ego makes the decision
with probability ρ◦ if C is present on the lot and ρ◦ otherwise. (We shall assume that
c −c   b −   b.)
The Mechanism. The agent chooses whether or not to go to the dealership. After he
makes his choice and before he reaches the dealership, the lottery over menus is resolved2.2 A Bargaining Application 9
for the seller. Each player then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability ½. Let
us assume, for simplicity, that the seller knows whether he is bargaining with the alter-
ego or with the decision-makers’s long-run self.6 Notice that while the seller may offer a
single car, the set of prizes (and hence the menu) is still inﬁnite as the decision-maker also
cares about the price he pays for the car.
Bargaining If C is present on the lot and the alter ego appears (an event with joint prob-
ability qρ◦), the price will be
pc,c =



c −c if seller makes offer;
0 otherwise.
Here we assume that the alter ego chooses the coupe if it is present; he will compare the
utilities from the two cars if both are present and the prices charged by the seller in that
eventuality will make him indifferent between the two models and his outside option.
The decision-maker’s utility is then
½(b −(c −c))+½b = b −½(c −c).
If C is not present on the lot and the alter ego appears (an event of probability
(1−q)ρ◦), a similar calculation gives the decision-maker’s utility as
b −½(b −  c).
Note that c <   c   0 is a likely valuation of the outside options in that the tempted self
faces both the temptation of a souped up car as well as being tempted to pay a higher
price for both types of cars.
If the alter ego does not appear (an event with probability [1 − (1 − q)ρ◦ − qρ◦]),
the decision-maker’s utility will be ½b. Thus the decision-maker’s expected utility from
visiting the dealership will be
U∗ = ½[1−(1−q)ρ◦ −qρ◦]b +(1−q)ρ◦(½b +  c)+qρ◦(b −½(c −c)).
6This may be because the alter-ego is unable to hide his enthusiasm for the coupé or displays otherwise
benign signs which are noticed by the astute dealer.3 The Model 10
Thevalue of q will be chosen in equilibrium by the dealer in order tomake it worthwhile
forthedecision-maker tocometothedealership, evenwiththeprospect ofbeing tempted
by the coupé deterring this choice. In other words, the dealer will ensure that
U∗ = q [ρ◦(b −½(c −c))−ρ◦  c]+(½b +ρ◦  c)   0.
3 The Model
We have in mind a decision-maker who faces a two-period decision problem. In the ﬁrst
period, the agent chooses the set of alternatives from which a consumption choice will be
made in the second period. Nevertheless, as in Kreps (1979), DLR and GP, we shall only
look at ﬁrst period choices. Let us now describe the ingredients more formally. (The
basic objects of analysis are exactly the same as GP.)
The set of all prizes is Z where (Z,d) is a compact metric space. The space of proba-
bility measures on Z is denoted by ∆ (with generic elements being denoted by α,β,...)
and is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. This topology is metrisable and
we let dp be a metric which generates this topology. As in GP, the objects of analysis are
subsets of ∆. Let   be the set of all closed subsets of ∆ (with generic elements, called
menus, denoted by x,y,...) endowed with the Hausdorff metric
dh(x,y) := max
 
max
x
min
y
dp(α,β),max
y
min
x
dp(α,β)
 
.
Convex combinations of elements x,y ∈   is deﬁned as follows. We let λx+(1−λ)y :=
{γ = λα+(1−λ)β : α ∈ x,β ∈ y} where λ ∈ [0,1]. (This is the so-called Minkowski
sum of sets.) We are interested in binary relations   which are subsets of   ×  . (In
the sequel, read A→ B as A implies B unless the arrow is a limit. In either case, it should
be clear from the context what the intended arrow denotes and no confusion should
arise.)
Before we impose axioms on  , it may be worthwhile to dwell on the implications
of the model. The use of subsets of lotteries over Z as the domain for preferences instead4 Axioms and Representations 11
of subsets of Z itself was ﬁrst initiated by DLR in this context and is reminiscent of
the approach pioneered by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). From a normative point of
view, this approach should not be troublesome as long as our decision-makers are able to
conceiveofthelotteries theyconsumeandagreewiththeaxiomsweimposeonthem. But
from arevealed preferenceperspective, aredecision-makers faced with menus of lotteries?
As noted by Kreps (1988, pp. 101) (in the context of the Anscombe-Aumann theory), if
decision-makers are not faced with choices of lotteries, our assumption that they are can
be quite burdensome, especially from a descriptive point of view.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that such menus of lotteries are, in fact, objects of
choice. A patient who chooses to go to a hospital (in Schelling’s example) is, arguably,
choosing a menu of lotteries with the level of pain being an uncontrolled random event.
Similarly, a seafood fancier who goes to a restaurant not knowing the quality of the
shrimp he is about to get, is doing the same. It is also possible that the menu of lotteries
could arise from a non-degenerate mixed strategy played by an opponent, for instance in
determining the set of objects available for sale by, say, a car dealer. There is, of course,
the analytical beneﬁt of our approach, which is the use of the additional structure a linear
space provides. (Prime examples of this are Anscombe-Aumann and DLR.)
4 Axioms and Representations
We impose the following axioms on our preferences.
Axiom 1 (Preferences)   is a complete and transitive binary relation.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) The sets {y : y   x} and {y : x   y} are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence) x ≻ y and λ∈ (0,1] implies λx +(1−λ)z ≻ λy +(1−λ)z.
The ﬁrst axiom is standard. Axiom 2 is a continuity requirement in the Hausdorff
topology. The motivation for Independence is the familiar one and some normative ar-
guments in its favour are given in DLR and GP. It basically says that our decision-maker4 Axioms and Representations 12
does not distinguish between simple and compound lotteries and all that matters to her
are the prizes. Nevertheless, as noted by Fudenberg and Levine (2005), this may not be
an innocuous assumption.
Let us deﬁne
B(x) :=
 
β∈x
{α ∈ x :{α}  {β}}
and
W(x) :=
 
β∈x
{α ∈ x :{β}   {α}}
to be the sets of best and worst elements respectively in x. In light of Continuity and the
compactness of x, it follows that both B(x) and W(x) are well deﬁned. Our next axiom
captures the essence of temptation.
Axiom 4 (Temptation) For all x, B(x)   x  W(x).
Temptation says that insofar as the presence of alternatives different from the best alter-
native in the menu affects the decision-maker, it does not make the decision-maker worse
off than his worst choice in the menu. Note that this implicitly rules out any role for
ﬂexibility. (If it is the case that for some α,β ∈ ∆, {α,β} ≻ {α},{β}, the decision-maker
can be said to have a preference for ﬂexibility. Temptation rules this out.) But it also says
that the cost of temptation (i.e. the cost of not being able to choose the best alternative)
is bounded. In particular, it rules out situations like Sen’s rational donkey, which starves
because it is unable to make a choice between two equally acceptable alternatives. In
other words, it is never the case that “analysis is paralysis.”
A decision-maker who faces no temptation would simply pick the best lottery in
any menu. Our decision-makers however do not always do so. Consider three prizes,
broccoli (b), rich chocolate cake (c) and deep-fried Mars bars (m). Let us suppose the
decision-maker has thefollowing preferences over the prizes in the morning: {b} ≻ {c} ≻
{m}. A “standard” decision-maker would always pick her most preferred alternative in
any menu she encounters in the afternoon. But we are interested in decision-makers who4 Axioms and Representations 13
are not immune to temptations. Suppose the decision-maker has preferences over the
following menus: {b} ≻ {b,c}  {c}. We can then conclude that the presence of c in the
menu, which makes the decision-maker worse off, is the sourceof temptation. (Formally,
let {β} be any lottery. Say that {α} tempts {β} if {β} is superior to {α} and the addition
of {α} to {β} makes the agent strictly worse off, i.e. {β} ≻ {α,β}   {α}.)
Now, also suppose {b} ≻ {b,m}   {m}. It is then reasonable to expect that a menu
which consists of b and a lottery over c and m also makes the decision-maker worse off
as compared to the menu which consists only of b. In other words, it is reasonable to
expect that for all λ∈ [0,1], {b} ≻ {b,λc+(1−λ)m}. This is reﬂected in our nextaxiom.
Axiom 5 (Regularity) {β} ≻ {β,α1} and {β} ≻ {β,α2} implies {β} ≻ {β,λα1 +(1 −
λ)α2} for all λ ∈[0,1].
Our next axiom is an excision axiom in that it allows us to excise elements from a
menu without affecting the value of the menu to the decision-maker. Let us say that
β ∈ x is untempted in x if thereexists α′ ∈ x such that{β} ≻{α′} andfor all α ∈ x, {β} ⊁
{β,α}. Consider once again the three prizes, broccoli (b), rich chocolate cake (c) and
deep-fried Mars bars (m). As before, our decision-maker has the following preferences
over the prizes in the morning: {b} ≻ {c} ≻ {m} and both m and c tempt b, i.e. {b} ≻
{b,c},{b,m}. Thus, the presence of c and m make the decision-maker strictly worse
off. Now, suppose that adding m to the menu {c} does not affect the decision-maker,
i.e. {c} ∼ {c,m}. This implies that the “real” temptation comes from the rich chocolate
cake and the addition of m to the menu {b,c} should leave the agent indifferent, (i.e.
{b,c}∼ {b,c,m}). Our next axiom formalises this idea.
Axiom 6 (AoM: Additivity of Menus) For x,y ﬁnite, if β ∈ x ∪y is untempted in x ∪y,
then
{β} ∼ {β}∪y ←→ {β}∪ x ∪y ∼ {β}∪ x.4 Axioms and Representations 14
We now deﬁne the linear functionals relevant to a dual self representation. As is
standard, weshallsaythat U :   → IR islinear if U(λx+(1−λ)y) =λU(x)+(1−λ)U(y)
for all x,y ∈   and λ ∈ (0,1) and that it represents   if it is the case that U(x)   U(y) if
and only if x   y. The functions u,v : ∆ → IR are linear if similar conditions hold. Let
Bv(x) = argmaxβ∈x v(β) be the set of v-maximisers in x (with a similar deﬁnition for
Bu). Let β∗
x ∈ Bu(x) and let   βx ∈Bu (Bv(x)).
For any menu x, we shall say that the decision-maker, when confronted with a choice
from the menu x, gets “tempted” with probability ρx. If ρ is to be consistent with
linearity of U, then it must be the case that for all λ ∈(0,1),
ρλx+(1−λ)y =
λρxδx +(1−λ)ρyδy
λδx +(1−λ)δy
(♣)
where δx := u(β∗
x) − u(   βx) and δy := u(β∗
y) − u(   βy). (The expression follows from
the linearity of u and v and the observation that if β∗
x (resp.   βx) maximises u (resp. v)
over x and if β∗
y (resp.   βy) maximises u (resp. v) over y, then λβ∗
x + (1 − λ)β∗
y (resp.
λ   βx + (1 − λ)   βy) maximises u (resp. v) over λx + (1 − λ)y. Let us ﬁrst formalise this
suggestive terminology.
Deﬁnition 4.0.1. A linear functional U :   → IR admitsa dual self representationif there
exist continuous linear functionals u,v : ∆ → IR unique up to afﬁne transformations with
u := U|∆, a correspondence ϕ :   ։ [0,1] that admits a selection ρ so that
U(x) = (1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
v(β).
Moreover, (i) ϕ(x) ⊂ (0,1] is a singleton if Bu(x)∩Bv(x) = ∅, (ii) ρx = ρx+c for all signed
measures c such that c(∆) = 0 and x +c ∈   and x such that ϕ(x) is a singleton, (iii) ρ is
consistent with the linearity of U and (iv) ρx =ρ
x∩
 
α:{α}<{   β}
  where   β ∈ Bu(Bv(x)).
Thedual selftheorembelow saysthatwhenfaced withchoices ofmenus, thedecision-
maker who satisﬁes Axioms 1–6 behaves as if he has an alter-ego who has a utility func-
tion over lotteries given by v. Moreover, this alter-ego chooses the lottery in his most-
preferred set (in x) which maximises the decision-maker’s utility. Also, the decision-4 Axioms and Representations 15
maker behaves as if he will be tempted (i.e. the probability that the choice will be made
by the alter-ego) with a probability of ρx when faced with the menu x.
It should be emphasised that ρx and v are subjective and hence unobservable. The
only observables here are ﬁrst period behaviour. Furthermore, the decision-maker be-
haves as if second period choice from a convex menuis from an extremeface of the menu.
(That the decision-maker is indifferent between any menu and its convex hull is proved in
Lemma A.0.2 in the Appendix.) Notice also that if ρ is to be linear, it must be constant.
The reason for this is easy to see. Since both U and u are linear (a fact which follows
from Independence) and U depends on u and ρ multiplicatively, it must be the case that
either ρ is non-linear or it is constant. Moreover, it is demonstrated in proposition 4.0.5
below that if ρ is to be a continuous selection, it must be constant.
The deﬁnition also says that while the probability of temptation depends on the
menu, this dependence is relative in the sense that the probability of getting tempted
is translation invariant (i.e. ρx = ρx+c for all signed measures c such that x +c ∈   and
c(∆) =0). This is a due to the moregeneral fact that Independence and Continuity ensures
that the preferences themselves are translation invariant. This is made precise below.
Deﬁnition 4.0.2. A binary relation   is translation invariant if x   y implies x + c  
y +c for all signed measures c such that c(∆) =0 and x +c,y +c ∈  .
Lemma 4.0.3 (Translation Invariance). Let   satisfy Axioms 1, 2 and 3. Then   is trans-
lation invariant.
Proof. See appendix.
But notice that the translation invariance of ρ only applies to menus where tempta-
tion is meaningful, i.e. menus where the decision-maker and his alter-ego do not share a
common maximiser. In addition, if there are lotteries α and β such that α tempts β, then
the alter-ego makes the choice with positive probability (for any menu where temptation
is meaningful in the sense deﬁned above) if his best choice differs from the best choice of
the cold-self. Finally, as a consequence of AoM, we ﬁnd that removing lotteries that give4.1 Other Representations 16
the alter-ego less utility than her best choice and are worse (for the decision-maker) than
the alter-ego’s choice leaves the value of the menu (to the decision-maker) unchanged. We
now state the dual self theorem formally.
Theorem 4.0.4 (Dual Selves). A binary relation   satisﬁes Axioms 1–6 if and only if there
exists a continuous linear functional U :   → IR, unique up to afﬁne transformation, that
represents   and U admits a dual self representation.
Proof. See appendix.
We should point out that in the dual self representation above, ρ cannot be constant
as this would violate the continuity of  . We now show that if   is continuous, then
there exists no continuous selection ρ.
Proposition 4.0.5. Let ρ be a continuous selection. Then ρ is constant.
Proof. Suppose ρ is a continuous selection and suppose it is not constant. Then, there
exist menus x,y such that ρx  = ρy. Then, for any singleton {β}, ρλ{β}+(1−λ)x = ρx and
ρλ{β}+(1−λ)y = ρy. (This follows from equation (♣) above.) But for any ǫ> 0, there exists
λ large enough such that
dh (λ{β}+(1−λ)x,λ{β}+(1−λ)y) < ǫ
but ρx and ρy remain just as far apart, contradicting the continuity of ρ.
Thus, no matter what additional axioms we choose, we cannot have continuous ρ
except if ρ is constant. Furthermore, if ρ is constant, then it must be the case that   is
discontinuous. We examine the case of constant ρ in the next section.
4.1 Other Representations
The dual self representation allows many possibilities. Indeed, it encompasses the GP
representation (see §5.1 below) and allows ρ to depend on arbitrarily many items in a
menu. We can, nevertheless, say that there can be no continuous selection ρ. This was4.1 Other Representations 17
demonstrated in proposition 4.0.5. Moreover, the dual self theorem rules out situations
where the decision maker has no self control, i.e. decision makers who have a dual self
representation with ρx = 1 for all x. This is because such a decision maker’s preferences
are typically only upper-semicontinuous (and not continuous). In this section, we intro-
duce another excision axiom which will give us this possibility and also the case where
ρx ∈[0,1] is a constant for all x. Let us ﬁrst weaken Continuity appropriately.
Axiom 2a: (Upper Semicontinuity) The sets {y ∈  : y   x} are closed.
Axiom 2b: (Lower von Neumann-Morgenstern Continuity) x ≻ y ≻ z implies λx +
(1−λ)z for some λ∈ (0,1).
Axiom 2c: (Lower Singleton Continuity) The sets {α : {β}  {α}} are closed.
Axioms 2a–c are identical to Axioms 2a–c in §3 of GP. They weaken Continuity just
enough to enable us to have a linear utility representation that admits a dual self repre-
sentation. Notice also that Axioms 2a–c are strictly weaker than Axiom 2.
We have already seen one kind of excision in AoM. Another kind of excision is the no-
tion that the only items in a menu that matter to a decision-maker are the alternative he
would have chosen were he not tempted and the item in the menu that causes him max-
imal temptation. For instance, suppose the decision-maker’s preferences are as follows:
{b} ≻ {b,c} ≻ {c} ≻ {c,m} ≻ {m}. Thus, although c tempts b, c itself is tempted by m.
Then, whenever both are present, we will require that the decision-maker is unaffected
by the presence of c. In other words, {b,c,m} ∼ {b,m}. We shall formalise this below.
Let us say that β ∈ x is tempted if there exists y ⊂ x such that {β} ≻ {β}∪y.
Axiom 7 (SoM: Separability of Menus) If x is ﬁnite and β / ∈B(x ∪{β}) is tempted,
x ∪{β} ∼ x.
SoM says thatthe only alternative that matters in amenu(other than thedecision-maker’s
best alternative in the menu) is the object that is maximally tempting. We want to express4.2 Proof-sketch of Theorem 4.0.4 18
the idea that if the agent succumbs to temptation, he will fall all the way and choose
the most tempting alternative. This is a strong assumption, but it has the advantage of
providing a lot of structure to the dual self representation.
Theorem 4.1.1. A binary relation   satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2a–c, 3–7 if and only if there exists
an upper semicontinuous linear functional U :   → IR, unique up to afﬁne transformation,
that represents   and admits a dual self representation wherein
U(x) = (1−ρ)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρ max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that as opposed to theorem 4.0.4, we have weakened here the axiom Continu-
ity but also imposed an additional excision axiom SoM. A reasonable question to ask is,
What can we say about the case where we only weaken Continuity but do not require
SoM? In such a case, we can prove a weaker version of theorem 4.0.4 in that the dual
self representation only holds for either ﬁnite menus or menus that are the convex hulls
of ﬁnitely many points. Indeed, the proof of theorem 4.1.1 proceeds by ﬁrst construct-
ing such a representation. SoM then allows us to identify, for each menu, a two-element
subset that is equivalent to the original menu. Using this identiﬁcation enables us to es-
tablish the theorem for ﬁnite menus. Upper Semicontinuity then lets us extend the result
to arbitrary menus.
4.2 Proof-sketch of Theorem 4.0.4
The “only if” part of the proof is straightforward and is omitted. Here, we only sketch
the “if” part. The proof proceeds through a number of simple of arguments which we
describe below.
1. Representing  . An application of the mixture space theorem (lemma A.0.3) shows
that Preferences, Continuity and Independence guarantee the existence of a contin-
uous linear functional U unique up to afﬁne transformation which represents  .
Also U restricted to singletons is continuous.4.2 Proof-sketch of Theorem 4.0.4 19
2. The alter-ego’s preferences. For lotteries α,β such that {β} ≻ {β,α}  {α}, we stipu-
late that this must be because the alter-ego strictly prefers α to β. From Regularity
we see that for each β ∈ ∆, the set β+ := {α :{β} ≻ {β,α}   {α}} is convex. Re-
peated application of AoM tells us that β− := {α : {β} ∼ {β,α} ≻ {α}} is also con-
vex. Thus, β+ and β− are disjoint, convex sets and there exists a linear functional
vβ) which separates them. Furthermore, α ∈ β+ if and only if vβ(α) > vβ(β), i.e.
adding a lottery to {β} makes the decision-maker worse off if and only if the “alter-
ego” strictly prefers the new lottery to β. However, this linear functional depends
on β. We show next that the same linear functional performs the separation action
for all lotteries in the domain.
3. Translation Invariance. We say that U is translation invariant if U(x)   U(y) if
and only if U(x + c)   U(y + c) for all signed measures c such that c(∆) = 0
and x + c,y + c ∈   . That U is translation invariant follows from Continuity
and Independence. We use this property to show that there is an essentially unique
linear functional which performs the separation described in the previous step for
each lottery β. Thus, there exists a continuous linear functional which represents
the alter-ego.
4. Finite menus. For any ﬁnite menu x, let β∗
x ∈ x be such that u(β∗
x)= maxβ∈x u(x)
and let   βx ∈ x be such that u(   βx) = maxBv(x) u(β). Temptation and repeated appli-
cation of AoM implies that u(β∗
x)   U(x)   u(   βx).
5. Arbitrary menus. Using Continuity, we show that for all x, it is the case that
u(β∗
x)   U(x)   u(   βx) where β∗
x and   βx are deﬁned as above.
6. Representation. A simple application of the intermediate value theorem gives us the
desired representation and ρx for each x.5 Other Models of Temptation 20
5 Other Models of Temptation
5.1 The Requirement of Set Betweenness
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduce a condition on preferences called Set Betweenness
(SB). This requirement says that for all menus x,y ∈  ,
x   y −→ x   x ∪y   y. (SB)
Their representation theorem (as it pertains to us) says that if   satisﬁes axioms 1, 2a–c,
3 and Set Betweenness, then the utility of a menu is given by a function U deﬁned either
as
U(x) = max
β∈x
{u(β)+v(β)}−max
β∈x
v(β)
or
U(x) = max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
where U :   → IR is linear and upper-semicontinuous, u,v : ∆ → IR are continuous,
linear functionals unique up to the same afﬁne transformation and u = U|∆. The ﬁrst
representation obtains if   is continuous and the second obtains if   is upper semicon-
tinuous but not continuous. The second kind of representation described above is to
account for the possibility of “overwhelming temptation” where the agent always suc-
cumbs to temptation. In our terms, this corresponds to the case where the alter-ego
always makes the choice. But to better understand the representation, let us assume for
the moment, that U(x) is continuous. This immediately rules out the overwhelming
temptation representation. Let us write
c(β,x) :=max
β′∈x
v(β′)−v(β)
andinterpret c(β,x) tobethecostimposedbythetemptation (orthealter-ego)whenever
the most tempting item is not chosen. We can now rewrite
U(x) = max
β∈x
{u(β)−c(β,x)}5.1 The Requirement of Set Betweenness 21
which says that the utility to the decision maker of a menu is determined (additively) by
the utility of the best choice in the menu and the cost it imposes through its selection.
How does this compare with our representation? In other words, suppose the bi-
nary relation   satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3 and Set Betweenness, does it satisfy our axioms?
To see that the answer is afﬁrmative, notice that if   satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2 and 3, then
(by lemma A.0.3) there exists a continuous, linear functional U(x) (unique up to afﬁne
transformation) which represents   and u = U|∆ is continuous and linear.
Now consider lotteries α and β so that {β} ≻ {β,α}   {α}. In GP’s model, this is
possible if and only if v(α) > v(β). Thus, it must be that our alter-ego can be represented
by v. From GP’s main representation theorem (as described above), it is now routine to
verify that
max
β∈x
u(x)   U(x)   max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
so that there exists some ρx such that
U(x) = (1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
The case where
U(x) = max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
corresponds to the case where ρx = 1, i.e. the decision-maker gets tempted with proba-
bility 1. Moreover, ρ also satisﬁes the other requirements of Theorem 4.0.4 so that U(x)
is consistent with a dual self representation.
Thus, GP’s representation implies our representation. Put another way, a decision-
maker who satisﬁes Axioms 1–3 and Set Betweenness also behaves as if he has an alter-
ego who makes a choice with probability ρx when the menu chosen is x. Thus any
differences between the two models can only be detected by looking at second period
choice. The examples below shows there exist preferences which satisfy our axioms but
do not satisfy Set Betweenness.
Example 5.1.1. Let Z be any compact metric space where |Z|   3. Let αi ∈ ∆ for
i = 1,2,3,4sothat ½(α1+α2)= ½(α3+α4). Assumethat thedecision maker gets tempted5.1 The Requirement of Set Betweenness 22
with a constant probability ρ = ½. Let u be such that u(α1) > u(α3) > u(α4) > u(α2)
and v such that v(α4) > v(α2) > v(α1) > v(α3). It follows from our representation
theorem that if x := {α1,α2} and y := {α3,α4}, then U(x) = U(y), i.e. x ∼ y. But
U(x ∪y)= u(½(α1 +α4))> U(x) so x ∪y ≻ x ∼ y. Thus, our preferences do not satisfy
SetBetweenness whenthereis aconstantprobability (not equal to1)ofthe decision-maker
getting tempted. ♦
The example above relies on ρ being constant so that preferences areonly upper semi-
continuous and not continuous. We now show there are also continuous preferences
which satisfy our axioms (so ρ is not constant) and do not satisfy GP’s axioms. We ﬁrst
begin with some preliminaries.
An obvious consequence of GP’s representation theorem is that any menu x is equiv-
alent to a certain two-element subset. For two-element sets {α,β} where α tempts β, it
is straightforward to note that
U({α,β}) = max
β′∈x
{u(β′)+v(β′)}−v(α).
Since the preferences also satisfy our axioms, we ﬁnd that
ρ{α,β} = min
 
v(α)−v(β)
u(β)− u(α)
, 1
 
,
so that
U({α,β}) = (1−ρx)u(β)+ρxu(α).
Thus, for general x,
U(x) =(1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
where ρx = ρ{α,β} with β ∈ Bu+v(x) and α ∈ Bv(x). Now suppose there exists another
utility function which satisﬁes our Set Betweenness given by
  U(x) = max
β∈x
{u(β)+kv(β)} −max
β∈x
kv(β)5.1 The Requirement of Set Betweenness 23
where k ∈ [0,∞). The only difference between U and   U is the factor k. Note that for
any α,β where u(β) > u(α), U({β}) > U({β,α}) if and only if   U({β}) >   U({β,α}).
From the discussion above, we can write
U(x) =(1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
and
  U(x) = (1−   ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+   ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
Now it is easy to see that if U := λU +(1−λ)   U, then
U(x) =(1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
where ρx := λρx +(1 −λ)  ρx. But there is no reason to expect that U will, in general,
satisfy Set Betweenness. Indeed, the example below from Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(2005) shows that this indeed may be the case.
Example 5.1.2. Consider a weak-willed dieter who faces choices over broccoli (b) mul-
tiple temptations in the form of rich chocolate ice cream (c) and low-fat yogurt (y). A
natural set of rankings over menu is:
{b,y} ≻{y} and {b,c,y} ≻ {b,c}.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005) show that there is no GP representation which is
consistent with the above ordering. In other words, any extension of the ordering above
to the space of all menus would violate one of GP’s axioms.
Nevertheless, there is a dual self representation that is consistent with the above or-
dering. To see this most transparently, let u and v be as following:
b c y
u 6 0 4
v 0 8 65.2 Temptation and Multiple States 24
so that utility over menus is given by
U(x) = ½max
β∈x
u(β)+½
 
max
β∈x
[u(β)+v(β)] −max
β∈x
v(β)
 
.
In other words, with probability ½, the dieter is a standard agent and with probabil-
ity ½ he takes on GP type preferences. Note that U({b,y}) = 5 > 4 = U({y}) and
U({b,c,y}) = 5 > 3 = U({b,c}). Let us consider preferences which satisfy Axioms 2
and 3 and Set Betweenness. Such preferences have a GP representation (u,v). Such pref-
erences also have a dual self representation (u,v,ρ) where ρ is the probability of getting
tempted. Then, in the example above, his preferences can also be given by
U(x) =
 
1−
ρx
2
 
max
β∈x
u(β)+
ρx
2
max
β∈Bv(x)
v(β),
which is a dual self representation that does not satisfy Set Betweenness. ♦
5.2 Temptation and Multiple States
In another recent paper, Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005) consider generalisations of
GP preferences. Their starting point is the subjective state space approach pioneered in
DLR. DLR (and Dekel et al., 2005) show that when Z is a ﬁnite set of prizes, for any
continuous preference   over menus satisfying Lipschitz continuity (in the Hausdorff
topology) and Independence, there exists an essentially unique measure space S (which is
the state space), a ﬁnite measure  , functions U : Z×S → IR so that U(β, ) is measurable
with respect to S and U( ,s) is an expected utility function, and a continuous function V
where, for each menu x,
V(x) =
 
max
β∈x
U(β,s) d (s)
so that V represents  . Note that   is a signed measure and is not necessarily a proba-
bility measure. Indeed, because of the state dependent utility functions, it is not possible
to pin down the signed measure  . For a ﬁnite state space, their representation then
becomes
V(x) =
 
s∈S
max
β∈x
U(β,s) (s).5.2 Temptation and Multiple States 25
We shall call the above a ﬁnite additive EU representation of the preference  . An ax-
iomatisation of such a (ﬁnite state) representation is provided by Dekel et al. (2005)where
itis shownthataFinitenessaxiom7 is also necessary(andsufﬁcient) inaddition toIndepen-
dence and Continuity. While we do not wish to formally describe Finiteness, we should
point out that an implication of a ﬁnite state additive EU representation (which is the
class of preferences considered in DLR05) is that there exists an integer N > 0 so that for
all menus x, there exists a sub-menu x′ ⊂ x such that x′ ∼ x and the cardinality of x′ is
at most N.
Tosee the representation moreclearly, DLR05makethe following observation. If the
decision-maker were tobe uncertain about his future tastes (and not face any temptation),
then one would expect the measure to be positive. But in such a case, one would also
expect his preferences to satisfy Monotonicity, i.e. x′ ⊂ x implies x   x′. They then
show the following:
Theorem 5.2.1 (DLR05). The preference   has a ﬁnite additive EU representation with
a positive measure   if and only if it satisﬁes Continuity, Independence, Finiteness and
Monotonicity.
Such a result is intuitive and is the appropriate generalisation of the result in Kreps
(1979). The main question in DLR05 is to ﬁnd the appropriate analogue of Monotonicity
that captures the idea of temptation. An immediate axiom that one might use is Non-
monotonicity, namely that there exists a menu x with x′ ⊂ x such that x′ ≻ x. Thus,
there has to be some instance when the decision-maker does not value ﬂexibility and
therefore the measure   cannot be positive. But DLR05 want to look at a smaller class
of preferences. They want to look at the class of preferences where the decision-maker is
certain about the preferences of his untempted self. The only uncertainty is about what
form the temptation takes. A further generalisation that they consider is in the form of
the temptation cost. This is described below.
To model the uncertainty in temptation, DLR05 look at different linear functions
7For a full description of this axiom, see Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005) or Dekel et al. (2005).5.2 Temptation and Multiple States 26
vj : Z → IR which give rise to different cost functions
ci(β,x) :=
 
j∈Ji
max
β′∈x
vj(β′)−
 
j∈Ji
vj(β).
The key to uncertainty about temptation is then that the decision-maker is uncertain
about which cost function he will be facing. Thus, the generalisation of GP which ob-
tains, namely the temptation representation, can be written as
U(x) :=
 
qi max
β∈x
{u(β)−ci(β,x)}
where qi > 0 and
 
qi = 1 which means that qi can be interpreted as the probability that
the decision-maker is faced with the ith temptation in the form of the cost function ci.
The function u is such that u(β) := U({β}) and is called the commitment utility. (All
the functions u and vj are expected utility functions.)
To characterise such a preference, DLR05 introduce two more axioms. The ﬁrst says
that if the decision-maker could commit himself to a certain item in a menu, he would.
This is made precise in the following axiom.
Axiom (DFC: Desire for Commitment) There exists α ∈ x such that {α}   x.
It is obvious that Temptation implies DFC. However, there exist temptation represen-
tations that satisfy Temptation but not admit a dual self representation. This is demon-
strated in example 5.2.3 below. The second axiom introduced in DLR05 is as follows.
Axiom (Domination) 8 If there exists α ∈ B(x ∪{β}) such that {α} ∼ x and β / ∈ B(x ∪
{β}), then there exists ǫ> 0 such that for all   β ∈ Nǫ(β) and all x′,
x′ ∪ x   x′ ∪ x ∪{   β}.
The main representation theorem in DLR05 is then the following:
8Thisaxiomisfromanearlierversion oftheirpaper. Inthepresentversion, itiscalledAIC:Approximate
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Theorem 5.2.2. A preference relation   has a temptation representation if and only if it has
a ﬁnite state additive EU representation and satisﬁes DFC and Dominance.
It is straightforward to show that our representation implies Domination. Therefore,
it would seem that any continuous preference (in the Hausdorff topology) which has a
dual self representation strictly belongs to the class of preferences identiﬁed in DLR05.
But this is not the case, primarily because we do not have a ﬁniteness axiom. But let us
ﬁrst look at a a couple of examples where the decision-maker satisﬁes the DLR05 axioms
but does not have a dual self representation.
Example 5.2.3. Let Z be a ﬁnite set and let ∆ be the space of lotteries over Z. Deﬁne
utility function u, v1 and v2 so that
u v1 v2
α 0 2 2
β 0 1 6
Nowlet c(γ,x) :=
 
j
 
maxγ′∈x vj(γ′)
 
−
 
j vj(γ). Then U(x) :=maxβ∈x [u(γ)−c(γ,x)]
is a temptation representation.
Let x := {α,β}. Then c(α,x) = v1(α) + v2(β) − v1(α) − v2(α) = 4 and c(β,x) =
v1(α)−v1(β) = 1. This means that U(x) = maxγ∈x {u(γ)−c(γ,x)} = −1. Thus, {α} ∼
{β} ≻ x which is not possible in a dual self representation. (Note that this example does
not violate Temptation because B(x) = x =W(x).) ♦
Notice that if in the temptation representation, each cost function depends on only
one temptation i.e. each Ji is a singleton, such an example could not arise. In a dual
self representation, the decision maker does not care about the utility level of the alter-
ego. She only cares about the choice made by the alter-ego insofar as it affects her own
utility level. If we were to interpret the different vj’s in a temptation representation as
belonging todifferent selves who are the cause of the temptation, then we could say that a
temptation representation is an interdependent utilities model, where the decision maker
(or the “commitment self” in the terminology of DLR05) cares about the utility levels5.2 Temptation and Multiple States 28
of the different selves. We shall now see another example of a temptation representation
which does not admit a dual self representation. This time our axiom Regularity will be
violated.
v1
α1
v2
α2
u β
½α1 + ½α2
Example 5.2.4. Suppose the decision-maker has utility function u and is faced with two
temptations denoted by expected utility functions v1 and v2. Also, suppose that vj is
not a convex combination of vi and u for i  = j. Then, such a conﬁguration might look
as in the ﬁgure above. But such a conﬁguration would violate our axiom Regularity.
The violation is because the lottery α1 and α2 which both tempt β, but there also exist
lotteries over α1 and α2 which do not tempt β. ♦
It should be remarked that the construction above holds in any temptation represen-
tation where there is uncertainty about the form the temptation will take. We shall now
show that there exist preferences which have dual self representations but do not satisfy
ﬁniteness. Recall that GP preferences of the following form
Ui(x) = max
β∈x
{u(β)+kv(β)}−max
β∈x
kv(β)
for k ∈[0,∞), have a dual self representation with
ρx(k) =min
 
k
v(α)−v(β)
u(β)− u(α)
, 1
 
where β ∈ Bu+kv(x) and α ∈ Bkv(x). Now, let (ki) be a sequence such that ki ∈ [0,∞)
and the following holds: for x :=
 
i{βi} ∪α, βi ∈ Bu+kiv(x), βj ∈ Bu+kiv(x) implies
ki = kj and α ∈ Bv(x).5.3 Exogenous States of the World 29
Let (λi) be another sequence such that λi ∈ [0,1] for each i and
 
i λi = 1. Now, it
easy to see that
U(x) =(1−ρx)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρx max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
where ρx =
 
i λiρx(ki), is part of a dual self representation with ρx satisfying all the
necessary conditions for this to be so. By choosing the ki’s and λi’s appropriately, it is
therefore possibly to construct dual self representations which do not satisfy ﬁniteness.
In other words, these utility functions are such that the utility of a menu can depend on
an arbitrarily large (countable) sub-menu. This is because each ρ(ki) depends on {βi,α}
and we can make the set of βi’s arbitrarily large. Indeed, this is the spirit of example
5.1.2.
We can further generalise this construction (as suggested by Bart Lipman). Let   be
a Borel probability measure on [0,1) and let ρx =
 
ρx(k) d (k) so that we have a dual
self representation which again does not satisfy ﬁniteness.
5.3 Exogenous States of the World
Our representation admits a straightforward extension to ﬁnite exogenous states. This
would be the formal equivalent of the model studied by Bernheim and Rangel (2004)
limited to two periods. Formally, let S be a ﬁnite set of states with the probability that
state s ∈ S occurs being given by πs. The state is realised after the decision-maker chooses
the menu. We take this to be some set of exogenous circumstances that affect the agent
only inasmuch as they affect the likelihood of his getting tempted. Note that the agent’s
utility function does not change across states nor does his alter-ego’s. The only thing that
changes is the probability of getting tempted. In particular, we are looking for a utility
function (over menus) that looks like the following:
U(x) =
 
s∈S
πs
 
(1−ρs
x)max
β∈x
u(β)+ρs
x max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β)
 
.
In particular, note that the probability of getting tempted can depend on both the menu
and the state.6 Conclusion 30
Example 5.3.1. Let S := {0,1,...,n} and let ρx
i be the probability of getting tempted in
the state of the world i. Then one speciﬁcation could be the following:
ρi
x <ρ
i+1
x
for all x and ρ0
x = 0 for all x. If in addition we assumed ρi
x = ρi
y for all x,y ∈   for all
i ∈ S, we would get the Bernheim-Rangel model. ♦
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a decision-maker faced who has to decide on the set of feasible
choices from which an actual choice will be made at a later point in time. We rule out the
casewherethedecision-maker maypreferlargersets offeasiblechoices duetoapreference
for ﬂexibility.
Our main contribution is to provide axioms on ﬁrst period preferences that enable
us to interpret this problem as a decision-maker who behaves as if he has an alter-ego
(with preferences different from his own), who makes the actual choice from the menu
with some probability. Doing so enables us to address problems where decision-makers
demonstrate apparent dynamic inconsistency (i.e. make ex-post choices that are inferior
from an ex-ante perspective) and make unambiguous welfare statements in these situa-
tions. We also relate our model to the inﬂuential papers of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2005).
Possible extensions include more explicit study of dynamic applications. We intend
to expand on the bargaining example discussed in brief in this paper, but this is left for a
future paper.A Proof of Theorem 4.0.4 31
A Proof of Theorem 4.0.4
The “only if” part of the proof is straightforward. Here we shall demonstrate the “if”
part of the proof. We ﬁrst begin with a crucial lemma which can also be found in DLR.
The proof is presented here for expositional ease. Recall that for any set x, its convex hull
is denoted by conv(x).
Lemma A.0.2. Let   satisfy Independence. Then for all ﬁnite x, x ∼ conv(x). Further-
more, if   satisﬁes Continuity, then x ∼ conv(x) for all x ∈  .
Proof. We shall proceed through a series of simple arguments.
Step 0. Let us denote the standard (n −1)-simplex by ∆n−1 := {p ∈ IRn :
 
pi = 1}
and its vertices by Vert(∆n−1). It is straightforward to verify that for all λ ∈ (0,1/n),
λVert(∆n−1)+ (1 −λ)∆n−1 = ∆n−1. Now, let x be the vertices of the (n − 1)-simplex
conv(x). In other words, |x| = n, dim(conv(x)) = n −1 and conv(x) is linearly isomor-
phic to ∆n−1. Thus, for all λ∈ (0,1/n), λx +(1−λ)conv(x) =conv(x).
Step 1. Let x now be any ﬁnite set. We know that conv(x) has a simplicial decomposi-
tion, K suchthatVert(K)= x andeachsimplex hasthesamedimension as conv(x). Now
apply the result of Step 0 to each simplex to conclude that for any λ ∈
 
0,
1
dim(conv(x))+1
 
,
λx +(1−λ)conv(x) =conv(x).
Step 2. For any ﬁnite x, suppose conv(x) ≻ x. Then, for any λ ∈
 
0,
1
dim(conv(x))+1
 
,
conv(x) = λconv(x) + (1 − λ)conv(x) ≻ λx + (1 − λ)conv(x) = conv(x) which is a
contradiction (where the relation in the middle follows from Independence). Alterna-
tively, suppose x ≻ conv(x). Then conv(x) = λx +(1−λ)conv(x) ≻ λconv(x)+(1−
λ)conv(x) = conv(x) which is again a contradiction. Thus, x ∼ conv(x).
Step 3. Let x be an arbitrary closed set. Then (because x is compact), there exists a
sequence (xk) of ﬁnite sets such that xk ⊂ x and xk → x (in the Hausdorff metric). Thus,
conv(xk) → conv(x). From the continuity of  , we see that x ∼ conv(x).
We shall now show that there exists a continuous linear functional that represents
preferences. (This is Proposition 2 in DLR.) Recall that   is the space of all closed
subsets of ∆.A Proof of Theorem 4.0.4 32
Lemma A.0.3. If   satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2 and 3, then there exists a continuous linear func-
tional U :  → IRthatrepresents . Furthermore, U isunique up toafﬁne transformations.
Proof. Let X ⊂   be the space of all closed convex subsets of ∆. Notice that X endowed
with the Minkowski sum is a mixture space. It only remains to verify the mixture space
axioms (see Kreps, 1988, page 52). By assumption, Independence holds. Continuity en-
sures that vN-M continuity is also satisﬁed. Thus, by the mixture space theorem, there
exists a linear functional V : X → IR so that for all x,y ∈ X, V(x)   V(y) if and only if
x   y.
We now extend V to all menus. Let us deﬁne U :   → IR as follows: for all x ∈   ,
let U(x) := V (conv(x)). It is easily seen that U represents  . All that remains to be
shown is that U is linear.
From lemma A.0.2, it follows that λx +(1−λ)y ∼ conv (λx +(1−λ)y). Also x ∼
conv(x) and y ∼ conv(y). From Independence it follows that λx+(1−λ)y ∼ λconv(x)+
(1 − λ)y and λconv(x) + (1 − λ)y ∼ λconv(x) + (1 − λ)conv(y), i.e. λx + (1 − λ)y ∼
λconv(x)+(1−λ)conv(y). Therefore,
U(λx +(1−λ)y) = U (λconv(x)+(1−λ)conv(y))
= V(λconv(x)+(1−λ)conv(y))
= λV(conv(x))+(1−λ)V(conv(y))
= λU(x)+(1−λ)U(y).
Note the heavy use of Independence in the proof. We are identifying the mixture
which gives x with probability   and y with probability 1−  with the convex combi-
nation of x and y,  x +(1− )y, an identiﬁcation which lies at the heart of the mixture
space theorem. Let us deﬁne u(α) := U({α}) and interpret it to be the decision-maker’s
utility from a lottery (in the untempted state). It is clear that u is a continuous, linear
function. Another important property of preferences that we shall make us of is transla-
tion invariance. This is made precise below.A Proof of Theorem 4.0.4 33
Deﬁnition A.0.4. A binary relation   is translation invariant if x   y implies x + c  
y +c for all signed measures c such that c(∆) =0 and x +c,y +c ∈  .
Lemma A.0.5 (Translation Invariance). Let   satisfy Axioms 1 – 3. Then  is translation
invariant.
Proof. Let x   y and c such that c(∆) = 0 and x +c,y +c ∈   . Simple geometry shows
that for all λ ∈(0,1),
λy +(1−λ)(x +c)= λ{λy +(1−λ)(y +c)}+(1−λ){λx +(1−λ)(x +c)}.
Then, since   is reﬂexive,
λy +(1−λ)(x +c)∼ λ{λy +(1−λ)(y +c)}+(1−λ){λx +(1−λ)(x +c)}.
From Independence we get
λx +(1−λ)(x +c)  λy +(1−λ)(x +c).
Combining the relations above
λx +(1−λ)(x +c)  λ{λy +(1−λ)(y +c)}+(1−λ){λx +(1−λ)(x +c)}.
From Independence we see that
λx +(1−λ)(x +c)  λy +(1−λ)(y +c).
But from lemma A.0.3 above, there exists a continuous linear functional U that repre-
sents  . Thus,
U(λx +(1−λ)(x +c))  U(λy +(1−λ)(y +c)).
Using the linearity of U and rearranging terms gives us for each λ∈ (0,1),
λ[U(x)−U(y)]+(1−λ)[U(x +c)−U(y +c)]  0. (⋆)
Now suppose by way of contradiction, y + c ≻ x + c, i.e. U(y + c) > U(x + c). This
would mean that there exists some λ ∈ (0,1) which does not satisfy (⋆) yielding the
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Lemma A.0.6. Suppose Axioms 1–6 hold. Then there exists a continuous, linear functional
v : ∆ → IR such that (i) {β} ≻ {α,β}   {α} if and only if v(β) < v(α) and (ii) for all x,
there exists   βx ∈ x such that U(x)   u(   βx) and u(   βx)= max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
Proof. See §A.1 below.
Now, there exists β∗ ∈ x so that u(β∗
x)   U(x) from where we can determine ρx
using the Intermediate Value Theorem, which completes the proof. The translation in-
variance of ρ follows from the translation invariance of U (see lemma A.0.5 above) and
the other properties of ρ are also easily obtained.
A.1 The Alter-ego’s Preferences
In this section, we shall construct the alter-ego’s preferences via some revealed preference
arguments thereby providing a proof of lemma A.0.6.
Let us deﬁne β+ := {α : {β} ≻{β,α}  {α}}. From Regularity, it follows that β+ is
convex. Let us also deﬁne β− :={α : {β,α} ∼ {β} ≻ {α}}. The lemma below shows that
β− is also convex.
Lemma A.1.1. Suppose   satisﬁes Axioms 1,3 and 4. Then, β− is convex.
Proof. Let α1,α2 ∈β−. By Independence and {β} ∼ {β,α2},
{β} ∼ λ{β}+(1−λ){β,α2}.
Independence and {β} ∼ {β,α1} also implies
λ{β}+(1−λ){β,α2} ∼ λ{β,α1}+(1−λ){β,α2}.
Transitivity of   implies
{β} ∼ λ{β,α1}+(1−λ){β,α2}.
But note that
λ{β,α1}+(1−λ){β,α2} = {β,λα1 +(1−λ)β,λβ+(1−λ)α2,λα1 +(1−λ)α2}.A.1 The Alter-ego’s Preferences 35
Applying AoM twice, we ﬁnd {β} ∼ {β,λα1+(1−λ)α2}. Since {β} ≻ {α1}, Independence
givesus{β} ≻ (1−λ){β}+λ{α1}. Also, {β} ≻ {α2}andIndependenceimplies(1−λ){β}+
λ{α1} ≻ λ{α1}+(1−λ){α2}. By the transitivity of ≻, {β} ≻ {λα1+(1−λ)α2}. Thus, β−
is convex.
Let us recall some deﬁnitions of objects in linear spaces. An afﬁne subspace (or linear
variety) of a vector space is a translation of a subspace. A hyperplane is a maximal proper
afﬁne subspace. If H is a hyperplane in a vector space V, then there is a linear functional
f on V and a constant c such H = {x : f (x) = c}. Moreover, if H is closed if and only
if f is continuous (Luenberger, 1969, pp. 129, 130). For notational ease, we shall write
H as [f = c]. Similarly, (two of) the negative and positive half spaces are represented
as [f   c] and [f > c] respectively. For any subset S ⊂ V, let aff(S) denote the afﬁne
subspace generated by S, i.e. the smallest afﬁne subspace that contains S. Also, let ri C
denote the relative interior of a convex set C in (a normed vector space) V.
Lemma A.1.2. Let β∗ ∈ ri ∆. Then there exists v : ∆ → IR which is continuous and linear
so that β∗
− ⊂ [v   v(β∗)] and β∗
+ ⊂ [v > v(β∗)].
Proof. Recall that space of all signed (countably additive) measures on (Z,d) is a Banach
space V with the total variation norm (see, for instance, Aliprantis and Border, 1999, pp.
360). Notice that ∆ ⊂ V. Indeed, the minimal subspace of V that contains ∆ is V. Thus,
aff(∆) is a hyperplane. Let aff(∆) = x0 +M where M is a subspace of V. (If β∗
+ = ∅, let
v = u = U|∆. Henceforth, we shall assume β∗
+ is not empty.)
Now, (β∗
− − x0)∩(β∗
+ − x0) = ∅. Furthermore, β∗
+ − x0 contains an interior point
(in the topology relative to M). (To see this, suppose not. Then, there exists α ∈ β+ −
x0 and a sequence (αn) such that αn → α and αn ∈ β∗
− − x0. That is {β∗} ∼ {β∗,αn}
for all n and {β} ≻ {β,α}. But this contradicts Continuity. Indeed, it contradicts the
upper semicontinuity of the preferences.) It is also straightforward to verify that β∗
−−x0
contains no interior points of β∗
+ − x0. Thus, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem
(Luenberger, 1969, pp. 133), there exists a closed hyperplane that separates β∗
− − x0 and
β∗
+−x0. Moreover, β∗−x0 ∈ H. Let f bealinear functional onM suchthat H =[f = c]A.1 The Alter-ego’s Preferences 36
for some constant c and β∗
+ − x0 ⊂ [f > c]. From Continuity (more speciﬁcally, from
the upper semicontinuity of preferences) it follows that (β∗
− − x0)∩H  = ∅. Now deﬁne
v(α) := f (α − x0). Thus, v is linear on ∆ and continuous. Furthermore, β∗
− ⊂ [v  
v(β∗)], β∗ ∩[v = v(β∗)]  =∅ and β∗
+ ⊂ [v > v(β∗)].
We have thus far established that for some β∗, there exists a continuous linear func-
tional v that represents the alter-ego’s preferences at that point. We will now show that
there is a single continuous, linear functional which represents the alter-ego’s preferences
over the entire domain. (We shall use Translation Invariance towards this end.) Note
that for β ∈ ri ∆, there exists ǫ > 0 such that Nǫ(β) ⊂ ri ∆. Also recall a fact about the
Hausdorff metric, dh. For all λ ∈[0,1],
dh ({β},{β,λα+(1−λ)β}) =(1−λ)d ({α},{β}).
Lemma A.1.3. For all β ∈ ∆, [v = v(β)] separates β− and β+.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists β ∈∆ such that either
(i) ∃ α ∈ β− such that v(α)   v(β), or
(ii) ∃ α ∈β+ such that v(β)   v(α).
Let us consider the ﬁrst possibility.
Let c = β∗ −β. Since β∗ ∈ ri ∆, there exists ǫ > 0 such that Nǫ(β∗) ⊂ ri ∆. From
Independence,we can assume α ∈ Nǫ(β). Thus, α+c ∈Nǫ(β∗). Since v is continuous and
linear, v(α + c) > v(β+c) = v(β∗). This implies that {β+c} ≻ {β+c,α +c} which,
by Translation Invariance9, is equivalent to {β} ≻ {β,α} which is a contradiction of the
hypothesis that α ∈ β−.
The second possibility is taken care of with a similar argument, thus establishing the
desired result.
Lemma A.1.4. For all ﬁnite x
max
β∈x
u(β)   U(x)   max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
9Notice that we only require Translation Invariance to hold for two-element subsets.B Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 37
Proof. Let β∗ ∈ x such that u(β∗) = maxβ∈x u(β) and let   β ∈ x such that u(   β) =
max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β). Let x′ := {α ∈ x : u(α)   u(   β)} and y := {α ∈ x : u(α) < u(   β)}. Then,
x = x′∪y and by Temptation, β∗   x′     β. Let y := {α1,α2,...,αn}. It then follows that
for each αi ∈ y, {β} ∼ {β,αi}. By AoM, it follows that {β} ∼ {β,α1,α2}. Repeatedly
applying AoM implies {β} ∼ {β}∪y. Once again applying AoM implies {β}∪ x′ ∪y ∼
{β}∪ x′ = x′. Thus, x ∼ x′ and {β}   x  {   β}.
Lemma A.1.5. For any x,
max
β∈x
u(β)   U(x)   max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
Proof. Let β∗ ∈ x such that u(β∗) = maxβ∈x u(β) and let   β ∈ x such that u(   β) =
maxβ∈Bv(x)u(β). Let (xk) be a sequence of ﬁnite sets where |xk| = k, xk ⊂ x, xk → x and
β∗,   β ∈ xk for each k.
By Temptation, u(β∗)   U(xk) for each k. Hence, by Continuity, u(β∗)   U(x).
Also, for each k, U(xk)  u(   β). Once again, Continuity implies that U(x)   u(   β). This
gives us the desired result.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1.1
We shall prove the theorem for ﬁnite menus. Towards this end, we show that there
exists a linear functional that represents preferences over essentially ﬁnite menus (which
are deﬁned below). Also, for ﬁnite menus x, x ∼ conv(x) and Translation Invariance
holds. SoM is then used to derive the representation for ﬁnite menus. A straightforward
continuity argument then extends the result to arbitrary menus.
Let us call a set x ⊂ ∆ essentially ﬁnite if x is ﬁnite or if x is the convex hull of a
ﬁnite set. Let us denote by  0, the space of all essentially ﬁnite menus, i.e. the space of
all essentially ﬁnite subsets of ∆. Also deﬁne X0 ⊂ X as the space of all closed convex
subsets of ∆ so that for each x ∈ X0, there exists a ﬁnite set x0 such that x = conv(x0).
In other words X0 consists of all closed convex sets that are the convex hulls of ﬁnite sets.
Before we begin, recall that lemma A.0.2 shows that for each ﬁnite x, x ∼conv(x).B Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 38
Lemma B.0.6. Let satisfy Axioms1,2a–cand3. Thenthereexistsanupper-semicontinuous
linearfunctional U :  0 → IR such thatforall x,y ∈  0, x   y ifandonly if U(x)   U(y).
Also, U is unique up to afﬁne transformation.
Proof. The proof is the same as that of lemma A.0.3. We shall only provide a sketch here.
Notice that X0 is a mixture space. Since Independence and von Neumann-Morgenstern
continuity also hold, there exists a V : X0 → IR, unique up to afﬁne transformation, so
that for all x,y ∈X0, x   y if and only ifV(x)  V(y). Now deﬁne U(x) :=V(conv(x))
for all x ∈  0. Linearity of U is demonstrated as in lemma A.0.3. Upper-semicontinuity
follows from Axiom 2a.
Another property that we shall establish for essentially ﬁnite menus is translation
invariance.
Lemma B.0.7. Let   satisfy Axioms 1, 2a–c and 3. Then for all x,y ∈  0, x   y implies
x +c   y +c for all signed measures c such that c(∆) = 0 and x +c,y +c ∈ 0.
Proof. For all x ∈ 0, if c is a signed measure such that c(∆) =0 and x+c ⊂∆, then x+
c ∈  0. The proof is now similar to the proof of lemma A.0.5. Notice that the proof of
lemmaA.0.5onlyreliedontheexistenceoflinear functional thatrepresentedpreferences.
From lemma B.0.6, such a functional exists which gives us the desired result.
We shall now construct the alter-ego’s preferences. The construction in §A.1 goes
through without change. Recall that in the construction of v, we only used the Upper
Semicontinuity of preferences and Translation Invariance for two-element subsets. Re-
peated application of AoM as in §A.1 gives us the following lemma.
Lemma B.0.8. Suppose Axioms 1–6 hold. Then there exists a continuous, linear functional
v : ∆ → IR such that (i) {β} ≻ {α,β}   {α} if and only if v(β) < v(α) and (ii) for all
x ∈ 0, there exists   βx ∈ x such that U(x)   u(   βx) and u(   βx) = max
β∈Bv(x)
u(β).
It follows from Temptation that for all x ∈  0, maxβ∈x u(β)   U(x)   u(   βx). The
dual self representation follows immediately giving us ρx for each x. The properties of ρ
which are required for it to be part of a dual self representation are easily veriﬁed.B Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 39
We now prove a simple lemma which shows that we can restrict attention to essen-
tially ﬁnite menus that lie entirely in the relative interior of ∆. (In what follows, we shall
denote the ǫ-neighbourhood of a point β ∈ ∆ by Nǫ(β) and the diameter of a set x by
diam(x). Weshall also repeatedly use the fact that ρ must be consistent with the linearity
of U, i.e. (♣) holds.)
Lemma B.0.9. For all y ∈  0 and for all ¯ ǫ > 0, there exists x ∈  0 so that x ⊂ ri ∆,
ρy = ρx and diam(x) < ¯ ǫ.
Proof. Let y be a menu and let   β ∈ Bu(y) be an extreme point of conv y. Also, let ¯ ǫ > 0.
Then, for all λ ∈ (0,1), ρ
λ{   β}+(1−λ)y = ρy. Moreover, for all ǫ > 0, there exists λǫ ∈ (0,1)
such that λǫ{   β} + (1 − λ)y ⊂ Nǫ(   β). Let us now take ǫ ∈ (0,¯ ǫ/2) so that for some
β∗ ∈ ri ∆, Nǫ(β∗) ⊂ ri ∆. Let c := β∗ −   β be a signed measure so that c(∆) = 0. By
the translation invariance property of ρ, it follows that for x := λǫ{   β}+(1−λǫ)y + c,
ρx = ρ
λǫ{   β}+(1−λ)y = ρy.
Lemma B.0.10. Let   have a dual self representation and satisfy SoM. Then, for all ﬁnite
x, for any β ∈Bu(x) and for any α ∈ Bu (Bv(x)), x ∼ {β,α}.
Proof. Let   x := {β1,...,βm}∪ x′ ∪{α1,...,αn}∪ y where βi ∈ Bu(  x) for i = 1,...,m,
αj ∈Bu(Bv(  x)) for j = 1,...,n, u(β1)> u(γ) > u(α1) for all γ ∈ x′ and u(α1)> u(γ′) for
all γ′ ∈ y. (Note that by deﬁnition, v(α1)> v(βi) and v(α1)   v(γ′) for all γ′ ∈ y.)
Since α1 is untempted in   x (which means, among other
u
v
β1 β2
α1
γ1
γ2
γ′
1 γ′
2
β1
2
things, that {α1} ∼ {α1} ∪ y), by AoM,   x ∼   x \ y. Also, by
AoM,   x ∼ {β1,...,βm}∪x′∪{α1}. BySoM,   x ∼{β1,...,βm}∪
{α1}. Let x := {β1,...,βm}∪{α1}. From lemma B.0.9,we can
assume, without loss of generality, that x ⊂ri ∆.
Let
 
βk
i
 
be a sequence in ri ∆ such that {βk
i } ≻ {β
k+1
i } ≻
{βi} and βk
i ∈ conv
 
{β1
i,α1}
 
for each k and limk→∞βk
i =
βi. Since x ⊂ri ∆, it is clear that such a sequence always exists.
Let xk
i = {βk
i ,α1}. BySoM,itfollows that{β1,...,βk
i ,...,βm}∪
{α1} ∼ xk
i . Furthermore, xk
i = λkx1
i +(1−λk){α1} for someB Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 40
λk ∈ (0,1) and λk > λk+1. Therefore, ρxk
i = ρx1
i . This implies that xk
i ≻ xk+1
i . By
Upper-Semicontinuity, it now follows that
x =lim
k
{β1,...,βk
i ,...,βm}∪{α1} ∼ lim
k
xk
i = xi
which gives us the desired result.
Lemma B.0.11. Let   have a dual self representation and satisfy SoM. Then for all β,α,α′
such that {β} ≻ {α} ∼ {α′} and α,α′ tempt β, it is the case that {β,α} ∼ {β,α′}. Hence,
ρ{β,α} = ρ{β,α′}.
Proof. By lemma B.0.9, we can assume that β ∈ ri ∆, so there exists ǫ > 0 such that
Nǫ(β) ⊂ri ∆. We can also assume that α,α′ ∈ Nǫ/4(β).
Let v(β) < v(α) < v(α′) and let c := α′ −α, c′ := α−β. By hypothesis, α tempts β,
so that α+c = α′ tempts β+c = β′. By Translation Invariance, {β,α} ∼ {β′,α′}. Also,
{β} ∼ {β′}.
Toseethis, supposethecontrary, i.e.suppose{β} ≁{β′}. Bydeﬁnition, β′ = β+c =
β + (α′ − α). By Translation Invariance, {β} + c′ ≁ {β′} + c′, i.e. {β} + (α − β) ≁
{β}+(α′−α)+(α−β) whichisequivalentto{α} ≁ {α′}whichcontradicts thehypothesis.
Henceβ,β′,α′ andα formtheverticesofaparallelogram. ByLemmaB.0.10,{β,α′} ∼
{β,β′,α′} ∼ {β′,α′}. This proves that {β,α} ∼ {β,α′}. Since {α} ∼ {α′}, it follows from
the representation that ρ{β,α} = ρ{β,α′}.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 for ﬁnite x. From lemma B.0.10, it follows that for any x, there
exist elements β,α ∈ x such that {β,α} ∼ x. Therefore, we can restrict attention to
two element subsets. Let x = {β,α} and y = {β′,α′} where x,y ∈ ri ∆, ǫ = diam(x)  
diam(y) > 0 and Nǫ(β) ⊂ ri ∆.
Let c := β−β′. Then, y +c ⊂ Nǫ(β) and ρy ∼ ρy+c. If u(α) > u(α′ +c), then there
exists λ ∈ (0,1) so that u(λβ+(1−λ)(α′ +c)) = u(α). Appealing to lemma B.0.11 now
gives us the desired result. (The case where u(α)   u(α′ + c) is dealt with in a similar
fashion.)B Proof of Theorem 4.1.1 41
We can now prove Theorem 4.1.1 for arbitrary menus.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.1. Let x ∈   , β ∈ Bu(x) and α ∈ Bu(Bv(x)). If β ∈Bu(Bv(x)), then
by Temptation, we are done. Let us assume this isn’t the case.
Consider a sequence (xk) such that for each k, xk ∈  0, xk ⊂ x, |xk| < |xk+1| and
limk xk = x. Deﬁne αk := λkβ+(1−λk)α for λk ∈ (0,1). We will also require that for
each k, β ∈ xk and αk ∈ Bu(Bv(xk)). Then, xk ∼ {β,αk} and U(xk) = ρU({β})+(1−
ρ)U({αk}).
Now, limk{β,αk} = {β,α}. Also, for each k, {β,αk} ≻ {β,αk+1}, i.e. xk ≻ xk+1.
From Upper Semicontinuity, it follows that U(x) = limk U(xk) = limk U({β,αk}) =
U({β,α}).REFERENCES 42
References
Ahn, David (2005). “Ambiguity without a State Space,” mimeo, University of California,
Berkeley.
Aliprantis, Charalambos D. and Kim C. Border (1999). Inﬁnite Dimensional Analysis: A
Hitchhiker’s Guide, 2nd ed., Springer, New York.
Anscombe, Frank J. and Robert J. Aumann (1963). “A Deﬁnition of Subjective Probabil-
ity,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34, 199–205.
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Antonio Rangel (2004). “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Deci-
sion Processes,” American Economic Review, 94(5), 1558–1590.
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman and Aldo Rustichini (2001). “Representing Preferences
with a Unique Subjective State Space,” Econometrica, 69(4), 891–934.
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman and Aldo Rustichini (2005). “Temptation-Driven Pref-
erences,” mimeo, Boston Unversity.
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman, Aldo Rustichini and Todd Sarver (2005). “Representing
Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum,” working paper.
Esteban, Susanna and Eiichi Miyagawa (2005), “Optimal Menu of Menus with Self-
Control Preferences,” mimeo, Pennsylvania State University.
Esteban, Susanna and Eiichi Miyagawa (2005), “Temptation, Self-Control, and Competi-
tive Nonlinear Pricing,” forthcoming, Economics Letters.
Esteban, Susanna, Eiichi Miyagawa and Matthew Shum (2003), “ Nonlinear Pricing with
Self-Control Preferences,” working paper.
Eliaz, Kﬁr and Rani Spiegler (2004). “Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents,” mimeo,
New York University.REFERENCES 43
Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine (2005). “A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control,”
working paper, UCLA.
Gauthier, David (1987). Morals by Agreement, Oxford University Press.
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001). “Temptation and Self-Control,” Economet-
rica, 69, 1403–1435.
Kreps, David M. (1979). “A Representation Theorem for ‘Preference for Flexibility’,”
Econometrica, 47, 565–576.
Kreps, David M. (1988). Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westview Press, Co., U.S.A.
Luenberger, David G. (1969). Optimization by Vector Space Methods, Wiley, New York.
Parﬁt, Derek (1986). Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press.
Rabin, Matthew (1998). “Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature,
36, 11–46.
Samuelson, Larry and Jeroen Swinkels (2004). “Information, Evolution and Utility,”
mimeo, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1978). “Egonomics, or The Art of Self-management,” American
Economic Review, 68(2), 290–294.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1984). “Self-command in Practice, in Policy and in a Theory of
Rational Choice,” (Richard T. Ely lecture), American Economic Review, 74(2), 1–11.